Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 33
Issue 5 November 2000

Article 2

2000

Combating Copyright Infringement in Russia: A Comprehensive
Approach for Western Plaintiffs
David E. Miller

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David E. Miller, Combating Copyright Infringement in Russia: A Comprehensive Approach for Western
Plaintiffs, 33 Vanderbilt Law Review 1203 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol33/iss5/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Combating Copyright Infringement in
Russia: A Comprehensive Approach
for Western Plaintiffs
David E. Miller'
ABSTRACT

This Article addresses several measures that U.S. and
Europeanfirms can undertake to combat copyright infringing
activities in Russia. First, the Article attempts to dispel the
notion that Russian law and the Russian government are
inadequate to deal with copyright and piracy problems. In
fact, recent surveys suggest that foreign plaintffs have
achieved some success in arbitrazh courts. Furthermore,
Russian authorities have begun to take steps to ensure that
these decisions will be enforced.
Second, the Author suggests that the United States and
European nations can apply pressure on the Russian
Federation to ensure compliance with copyright laws in the
context of bilateral treaties to which Russia is a party. Both
the United States and the European Union have current
treatieswith Russia that provide avenues for communication
of these concerns.
Finally, the Author argues that if Russia were admitted
into the World Trade Organization, procedures within that
organization could be employed to influence Russian
intellectualproperty policies and their enforcement. If Russia
were a party to the WTO, other member states could attempt
to enforce Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) standards, thereby improving foreign
copyright interests.

* J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, May 2000.
associate in the Moscow office of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.

1203

Mr. Miller is an

1204

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:1203

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................

1204

LITIGATION IN RUSSIA ...............................................
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS: LOBBYING FOR

1205

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PRESSURE ...............................
A.
U.S. Companies and the
1990 Trade Agreement.................................
B.
European Companies and the EC-Russia
PartnershipAgreement .................................

1212
1212
1214

IV.

COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: THE CASE FOR ADMITTING RUSSIA ......

1217

V.

CONCLUSION ..........................................................

1222

I. INTRODUCTION

United States and European firms lose millions of dollars
each year as a result of the illegal reproduction and sale of
copyrighted goods in Russia.' This piracy significantly limits the
sale of legal reproductions of motion pictures, sound recordings
and musical compositions, business and entertainment computer
software, and books. 2 This Article describes a comprehensive,
three-pronged approach that United States and European
plaintiffs can and should employ to combat piracy in Russia: (1)
litigation in Russia itself; (2) lobbying for intergovernmental
pressure within the framework of bilateral agreements between
Russia and both the United States and the European Union; and
(3) lobbying for Russia's admission to the World Trade
Organization. These three steps will help to reduce, if not to
eliminate, piracy in Russia over time.

1.
The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimates that U.S.
companies alone lost $963.9 million in 1998 as a result of the illegal reproduction
and sale of copyrighted goods in Russia. INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, 2000
SPECIAL 301 REPORT: RusSIA 139 (2000), available at http://www.iipa.com/
2000pdf/RUSSIA_2000.PDF (last visited Oct. 26, 2000). These figures should not
be taken at face value. They are based on estimates of the number of illegal
copies that were sold and the profits that companies assert they would have made
if all of the copies had been legal and sold at official prices. It is clear, however,
that many Russians could not afford these copies if they were sold at those prices.
Furthermore, some products would simply be unavailable in Russia if they were
not sold by pirates. Boris Kargalitsky, Costs and Benefits of Intellectual Piracy,
MOSCOW TIMES, June 6, 1997, LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
2.

INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, supra note 1, at 139.
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LITIGATION IN RUSSIA

Foreign firms often assume that Russia "has no law"-that is,
its written laws are poorly drawn and that its courts are inefficient,
incompetent, or simply corrupt.3 In fact, however, the Russian
government took impressive steps toward the development of a new,
comprehensive, and enforceable system of copyright laws in 1992
and 1993, when it adopted both the "Law on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs and Databases " 4 and the "Law on Copyright
and Neighboring Rights."s These measures replaced all prior Soviet
and Russian copyright laws. 6 Russia subsequently joined both the
Berne Convention 7 and the Geneva Phonograms Convention 8 in
1995.
These international agreements trump domestic law in
Russia.9 Finally, Russia made copyright infringers criminally liable
for their illegal actions in 1997.10

3.
Glenn P. Hendrix, Business Litigation and Arbitration in Russia, in A
LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA AND THE FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE
U.S.S.R. 135, 176-180 (Aviva Yakren ed., 2000). Unfortunately, Western scholars
who are unfamiliar with Russian courts continue to propagate these myths about
them.
E.g., William J. Kovatch, Jr., Joining the Club: Assessing Russia's
Applicationfor Accession to the World Trade Organization, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 995,
1036-37 (1998); Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Propertyin China and the
Former Soviet Union and its Effects Upon InternationalTrade: A Comparison, 46
BUFF. L. REv. 1, 68 (1998).
4.
Law of the Russian Federation "On the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs and Databases," ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA [ROSS. GAZETA], Oct. 20, 1992, at
5, translated in 19 REv. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 57 (1993) [hereinafter Computer
Programs Law].
See also Monica B. Vermeer, Note, A New Era in Russian
Copyright Law:
Protecting Computer Software in the Post-Soviet Russian
Federation, S TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1995) (analyzing the legal and
economic impact of Russia's computer software copyright laws).
5.
Law of the Russian Federation on Copyright and Neighboring Rights,
ROSS. GAZETA, Aug. 3, 1993, translated in 20 REv. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 85
[hereinafter Copyright Law].
6.
Igor Pozhitkov, Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection in the
Russian Federation,20 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 53, 55 (1994).
7.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July
24, 1971, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
8.
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866
U.N.T.S. 67.
9.
Article 3 ("International Treaties") of the Copyright Law provides: "If
rules, other than those of the present Law, are established by an international
treaty to which the Russian Federation is a party, the rules of the international
treaty shall be applied."
Copyright Law, supra note 5, art. 3.
See also
KONSTITUTSIIA RF [Constitution of the Russian Federation] (1993) art. 15, para. 4,
translatedin RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A RULE-OF-LAw STATE AND
A MARKET ECONOMY 1, 7 (William E. Butler & Jane E. Henderson eds., 1998).
10.
Article 146 ("Violation of Author's and Neighboring Rights") of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides:
(1) The illegal use of objects of author's right or neighboring rights, and
likewise the appropriation of authorship, if these acts have caused large-
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While foreign plaintiffs may pursue both civil and criminal
cases against copyright pirates within the Russian court system,
the available data suggest that foreign plaintiffs with copyright
claims should file only civil litigation. Criminal copyright cases
must be brought before a court of general jurisdiction, while an
arbitrazh court can hear civil copyright claims."
The power to
investigate criminal copyright complaints was transferred from
the prosecutor's office to the police in 1995 and then moved back
to the prosecutor's office in 1996.12 It appears that prosecutors
currently lack the resources to energetically pursue copyright
cases.1 3
In 1999, 276 criminal cases were brought against

scale damage-shall be punishable by a fine in an amount of from two
hundred up to four hundred minimum amounts of payment for labour, or
in an amount of earnings, or other revenue of the convicted person for a
term of from two up to four months, or by obligatory tasks for a term of
from one hundred twenty up to one hundred eighty hours, or by
deprivation of freedom for a term of up to two years.
(2) The same acts, committed repeatedly, or by a group of persons by prior
collusion, or by an organised group-shall be punishable by a fine in an
amount of from four hundred to eight hundred minimum amounts of
payment for labour, or in an amount of earnings, or other revenue of the
convicted person for a term of from four up to eight months, or by arrest
for a term of from four up to six months, or by deprivation of freedom for a
term of up to five years.
UGOLOVNYI KODEKS RF [Criminal Code of the Russian Federation], Jan. 1, 1997,
art. 146, translated in CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 84 (William E.
Butler trans., 1997). In a recent interview, an official from the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow who monitors developments in Russian intellectual property law reported
that this law may be amended by the end of 2000. The amendments under
consideration would def'me the term "large-scale damage" in precise monetary
terms, and the fires for piracy would significantly increase.
11.
The arbitrazh courts are the successors to a system of Soviet
institutions that resolved contract and related economic disputes between stateowned enterprises.
Despite their name, they are not arbitration tribunals.
Western scholars' opinions of the arbitrazhcourts have improved greatly over the
past several years. E.g., Hendrix, supranote 3, at 148-49; Glenn P. Hendrix, The
Experience of Foreign Litigants in Russia's Commercial Courts, in ASSESSING THE
VALUE OF LAW IN THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM (forthcoming 2000)
(manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Hendrix, The Experience of Foreign
Litigants]; Kathryn Hendley et al., A Regional Analysis of TransactionalStrategies
of Russian Enterprises, 44 MCGILL L.J. 433, 455-56 (1999); Neil F. O'Donnell &
Kirill Y. Ratnikov, Dispute Resolution in the Commercial Law Tribunals of the
Russian Federation: Law and Practice,22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 795, 84547, 872-73 (1997). The proposed changes to Article 146 of the Criminal Code in
note 10, supra, would also be likely to make copyright infringement a higher
priority for Russian prosecutors.
12.
INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, supranote 1, at 146.
13.
Id. This may be changing, at least for some types of products. See
Vladimir Merkushev, Microsoft Awaits Right Time for Russia Push, RUSSIA J., Dec.
21-27, 1999, at 12 (Olga Dergunova, Microsoft's general director in Russia,
reports that "[tihe police are initiating some 10 raids every month-seizing
compact disks and equipment."); Simon Saradzhyan, Illegal CDs Found at Rocket
Factory, MosCow TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000, at 4 (noting that two recent police raids
netted 650,000 pirated CDs of popular music, as well as two million CD
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alleged infringers of motion pictures, sound recordings, and
business software. 14 Only eighty-two defendants, however, were
convicted, and all but one paid minimal fines and served no time
in jail or prison.' 5 In other words, only 29.7% of all criminal
cases led to convictions, and sanctions were generally de
16
minimis.
As Table 1 indicates, plaintiffs are much more likely to
achieve favorable outcomes in the arbitrazh courts than in the
courts of general jurisdiction. In the Moscow City Arbitrazh
court, for example, 51.6% of all intellectual property cases
decided in 1998 resulted in a finding that the respondent was
guilty of violating Russia's intellectual property laws:
TABLE 1:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES FILED IN
7
NINE REGIONAL ARBITRAZH COURTS1

Court
Moscow City
Moscow Oblast
Leningrad Oblast
Novosibirsk
Ekatarinburg
Saratov
Voronezh
Yaroslavl
Altai Krai

IP Cases
Filed in 1998
124
8
28
3
8
0
0
1
0

IP Cases Won
in 1998
64
3
13
1
7
0
0
0
0

Furthermore, the available data suggest that foreign plaintiffs
also receive favorable rulings in at least half of the cases that they
file before arbitrazh courts.' 8
It thus appears that foreign

brochures). The proposed changes to Article 146 of the Criminal Code mentioned
in note 10, supra, would also be likely to make copyright infringement a higher
priority for Russian prosecutors.
14.
INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, supranote 1, at 143.

15.

Id.

16.
Id.
17.
I am indebted to Kathryn Hendley, Associate Professor of Law and
Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, for providing me with these
data. These figures were originally sent by individual arbitrazhcourts to the High
Arbitrazh Court on statistical reporting forms. Unfortunately, the forms do not
require the individual courts to break down intellectual property claims by their
three classifications: copyright, trademark, and patent.
18.
Hendrix, The Experience of ForeignLitigants, supra note 11, at 13 tbl. I
(noting that foreign plaintiffs won 53% of their cases in arbitrazhcourts in 1997);
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plaintiffs have a good chance of receiving favorable judgments
from arbitrazhcourts in copyright litigation.
The arbitrazhcourts are devoted exclusively to commercial
disputes and are charged with the 'protection of violated or
disputed rights and of the lawful interests" of legal entities and
registered entrepreneurs "in the sphere of business and of the
other kinds of . . . economic activity." 19
In particular, the

arbitrazh courts have jurisdiction over all economic disputes
involving foreign companies. 20 Legal entities-including foreign
companies-need not be registered or incorporated in Russia in
order to bring suit in an arbitrazh court for copyright
infringement. 2 1 Furthermore, the Berne Convention prevents
these courts from requiring copyright registration as a precursor
to filing such a suit. 22 In short, a foreign plaintiff who seeks to
sue an alleged infringer for making illegal copies in Russia faces
no particular jurisdictional or other procedural hurdle, other than
23
the usual need to identify the respondent with some specificity.
Strictly speaking, foreign plaintiffs may appear pro se before
24
Most, if
arbitrazhcourts, just like their domestic counterparts.
not all, will want to employ appropriate counsel; there are at least
twenty-five attorneys in Russia who specialize in intellectual

Mark Whitehouse, Take 'em to Court, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 10, 1998, LEXIS, News
Library, Mostms File (observing that in 1997, foreign companies won more than
two-thirds of the suits they filed in the arbitration court system).
19.
ARBITRAZHNYY PROTSESSUAL'NYY KODEKS RF [ARBITRAZH PROCEDURAL
CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION] art. 2 (May 5, 1995) [hereinafter ARBITRAZH
PROCEDURAL CODE].
20.
Id. art. 22(6); id. art. 210(1).
21.
Id. art. 22(6).
22.
Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(2) ("The enjoyment and the
exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality. . . ."). See also SAM
RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS: 1886-1986 §§ 5.81-5.85 (1987) (explaining the word "formality").
It
appears that Russian law will govern the issues of both ownership and
infringement under the Berne Convention, so extensive choice-of-law litigation
should not be needed. Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(1) ("Authors shall
enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in
countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their
respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the
rights specially granted by this Convention.")
23.
Such identification is generally necessary whenever one party seeks to
sue another for illegal behavior in almost any legal system. Some investigation is
the sine qua non of all successful litigation and is most likely to be successful
when a Western corporation has franchisees or dealers located in Russia. These
representatives are also in the best position to identify copyright pirates and to
represent the company's interests in judicial proceedings. Andrei A. Baev, Recent
Changes in Russian Intellectual Property Law and Their Effect Upon the Protection
of Intellectual Property Rights in Russia, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 361, 387
(1996).
24.
Kathryn Hendley et al., Observations on the Use of Law by Russian
Enterprises,13 POST-SOVIET AFF. 19, 23 (1997).
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property matters. 2 5 To initiate a case before an arbitrazhcourt,
the plaintiff must submit a comprehensive statement of claim,
including all relevant law and facts. 2 6 The plaintiff chooses the
venue; however, the case must be filed in the jurisdiction in
which one or more defendants are located. 2 7 Cases must be
resolved within two months after a complaint has been filed, 28
and delays are rare.2 9 Filing fees are set according to a sliding
scale that currently ranges from 5 percent to .05 percent of
damages claimed, depending upon the amount sought.3 0 Interim
relief may be sought "at any stage of the arbitration process" if
the absence of such relief might "interfere with or render
impossible the execution of the judicial act."3 ' Arbitrazh courts
are required to consider and act upon any request for interim
relief, such as seizure of equipment used to make illicit copies,
within one day.3 2 Furthermore, a respondent's failure to comply
with an interim order can lead to the recovery of additional
33
damages for losses incurred as a result thereof.
Prior to trial, an arbitrazh judge reviews the documents
submitted by both parties and informs them if any other evidence
should be provided.3 4 Discovery takes place between the parties;
a party may ask the court to secure any necessary
A decision by the court to refuse such a
documentation.3 5
request is subject to appeal.3 6 Arbitrazh courts may also compel
production. Persons (including non-parties) who refuse to comply
with an order to produce documentation are subject to fines by
these courts.3 7 Generally speaking, the judge, rather than the
parties or their counsel, controls the trial, and documentary

25.
Martindale-HubbellLawyer Locator, at http://www.martindalehubbell.
See also 3 MARTINDALEcom/locator/home.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2000).
HUBBELL INTERNATIONAL LAW DIRECTORY, at PA 444N (2000).

26.
27.
28.
29.
months.

ARBITRAZH PROCEDURAL CODE, supra note 19, art. 102.
Id. arts. 25-26.
Id. art. 114.
Ninety-five percent of all cases in 1995-1997 were resolved within two
Kathryn Hendley, Temporal and Regional Patterns of Commercial

Litigation in Post-Soviet Russia, 39 POST-SOVIET GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 379, 384

(1998).
Hendrix, supra note 3, at 160. See also ARBITRAZH PROCEDURAL CODE,
30.
supra note 19, art. 92.
31.
ARBITRAZH PROCEDURAL CODE, supra note 19, art. 75(1). This provision
has proven quite useful to some foreign businesses. See generally Whitehouse,
supra note 18 (discussing the Russian court's power to take "protective
measures").
32.
ARBITRAZH PROCEDURAL CODE, supranote 19, art. 75(2).
33.
Id. art. 76(4).
34.
Id. art. 53(2).
35.
Id. art. 71(1)-(3).
36.
Id. art. 71(4).
37.
Id. art. 54(2)-(4).
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evidence is taken much more seriously than oral testimony.3 8
Arbitrazh courts, however, do ensure an adversarial process.
Parties (or their counsel) have a guaranteed right to present
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, object to the other party's
evidence, make statements, and present arguments on all
relevant issues. 3 9 The court announces its decision at the
conclusion of the trial, and may also produce a written opinion at
that time. 40 A written decision must be issued within three days
in complex cases. 4 1 Parties have the right to appeal within thirty
days, and failure to appeal means that a judgment enters into
force. 42 As a general rule, court costs are split between the
parties in proportions that directly reflect the extent to which the
plaintiff has prevailed on its claim. 4 3 Each side pays its own
44
attorney's fees.
An arbitrazh court's decision is subject to three stages of
appellate review. First, the case is reviewed de novo by a panel of
45
three judges from the same court that originally heard the case.
4
6
The original judge may not serve on this panel.
Any ruling on
appeal takes effect immediately. 4 7 The second stage of review
takes place before a separate panel of three judges, 48 who are
generally academics, practicing attorneys, or government
officials. 4 9 While the law limits these judges to reviewing cases
for errors of law, s ° many of them admit that they also overturn
cases based on factual errors.5 1 Recent research indicates that
foreign plaintiffs win more frequently than domestic plaintiffs at
this stage of appellate review. S2 The Presidium of the Supreme
Arbitrazh Court has the right to review decisions by either the
arbitrazhappellate court or the circuit court upon petition by the
Chairman of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, the Prosecutor3
5
General of the Russian Federation, or their respective deputies.
Parties may formally ask these officials to file a petition for
38.
39.
40.

Hendrix, supranote 3, at 162.
ARBITRAZH PROCEDURAL CODE, supra note 19, art. 33(1).
Id. art. 126; id. art. 134(1).

41.

Id. art. 134(1).

42.

Id. art. 147.

43.

Id. art. 94.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Hendrix, supra note 3, at 167.
ARBITRAZH PROCEDURAL CODE, supra note 19, arts. 14, 145-160.
Id. art. 18(2).
Id. art. 159(3).
Id. arts. 161-79.
Hendrix, supra note 3, at 170.
ARBITRAZH PROCEDURAL CODE, supra note 19, art. 176.

51.
Kathryn Hendley, Remaking an Institution: The Transition in Russia
from State Arbitrazh to Arbitrazh Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 122 (1998).
52.
tbl. IV.
53.

Hendrix, The Experience of Foreign Litigants, supra note 11, at 21-22
Hendrix, supranote 3, at 171.
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reconsideration; however, the Supreme Arbitrazh Court will
review decisions only when5 4 they concern "extraordinary" matters
of broad legal significance.
Enforcement has long been the Achilles' heel of the arbitrazh
court system. 5 5 Enforcement was originally the responsibility of a
poorly paid group of employees who lacked the training and
resources necessary to collect money damages, seize property, or
56
A new system of
otherwise enforce arbitrazh court decisions.
armed bailiffs now exists as a matter of written law, but it is not
yet fully staffed or operational. 5 7 The burgeoning caseload of the
arbitrazh courts,5 however, suggests that they are generally
viewed as efficient, competent, and honest by both foreign and
domestic parties. German Gref, Russia's Minister of Trade and
Economic Development, recently indicated that the current
administration intends to devote particular attention to protecting
intellectual property rights.5 9 In addition, there is mounting
evidence that Russian authorities are prepared to enforce existing
copyright legislation. 60 In short, U.S. or European companies
confronted with ongoing copyright infringement can and should

Id. at 171-72 (citing Valentin Maslennikov, Judge Discusses New Laws
54.
on Arbitration Court Procedures, Ross. GAZETA, Feb. 22, 1995 (publishing an
interview with V.F. Yakovlev, Chairman of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court)).
See Hendley, supranote 51, at 109-18.
55.
See id. at 113-14.
56.
Federal Law No. 118-FZ of July 21, 1997 on the Officers ofJustice, LEXIS,
57.
Country & Region (excluding U.S.) Library, Rflaw File; Federal Law on an Execution
Proceeding, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA [COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION], 1997, No. 30, Item 3591, translated in RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF A RULE-OF-LAW STATE AND A MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 9, at 252.

Mikhail Rozenberg, who has practiced law in Russia for twenty years, claims that the
latter law has created "an effective system of enforcement of court decisions .....
Mikhail Rozenberg, Arbitration and Other Means of Resolving Disputes in Russia, 10
MEALEY'S INT',ARB. REP. 20 (1999), WL 10 MINTARBR 20.
See Hendley, supranote 29, at 381 tbl. 1.
58.
Catherine Belton, Foreign Business Upbeat on Putin, Moscow TIMES,
59.
Feb. 24, 2000, § 1904. Among other benefits, improved enforcement is likely to
raise tax revenues. According to one estimate, Russia loses almost $500 million
annually in uncollected taxes on pirated goods. Tim Kuik, Piracy in Russia: An
Epidemic, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 831, 831 (1999).
E.g., Remarks by RF Justice Ministry Officials on Intellectual Property
60.
Rights at a Breakfast of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (Official
Kremlin International News Broadcast, Feb. 22, 2000), LEXIS, News Library,
Sovnws File (containing the remarks of Alexander Korchagin, Director of the
Russian Agency for Patents and Trademarks-which is also responsible for
copyrights-discussing the government's commitment to improving legislation,
coordinating actions between the relevant government ministries and committees,
and training personnel at those ministries and committees). See also Andrew
McChesney, Cabinet Promises to Fight Piracy, MOSCOW TIMES, June 28, 2000, at 12; Peter Henderson, Counterfeit Products Burn Russia's Budget, RUSSIA J., July 3,
2000, at 15 (noting Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov's confirmation of the
importance of intellectual property protection to the Russian president, federal
administrative bodies, and the federal government).
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pursue litigation, before the arbitrazh courts. As the following
sections suggest, such companies also should pursue two other
means of improving enforcement of these courts' decisions.

III. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS: LOBBYING FOR
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PRESSURE
Both the United States and the European Union maintain
61
Politically
bilateral treaties with the Russian Federation.
their
lobby
should
and
can
industries
sophisticated copyright
Russian
the
on
pressure
respective governments to put
Federation for better enforcement of copyright laws within the
Multinational
treaties.6 2
bilateral
of these
framework
in this
efforts
their
to
coordinate
corporations may even be able
63
if
be
effective
to
likely
Such lobbying is particularly
regard.
defendants
Russian
against
these corporations have judgments
that the Russian courts have failed to enforce.
A.

U.S. Companies and the 1990 Trade Agreement

The 1990 Agreement on Trade Relations (Trade Agreement) is
potentially very useful to United States copyright industries. In

Agreement on Trade Relations, June 1, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 I.L.M.
61.
949 [hereinafter Trade Agreement]; Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation,
Nov. 28, 1997, Eur. Communities-Russ., 1997 O.J. (L 327) 3, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1997/en-297AI 128_0l.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Partnership Agreement]. The Trade Agreement
entered into force on June 18, 1992 and the Partnership Agreement entered into
force on December 1, 1997. Christopher Boffey, Note, Avtorskoye Pravo [Author's
Law]: The Reform of Russian Copyright Law Toward an InternationalStandard, 18
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 77, 92 (1994); European Commission, The EU's Relations
with Russia-An Overview, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/
russia/intro/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2000). The Trade Agreement did not
enter into force for two years as the result of lobbying by the Motion Picture
Association of America. Lana C. Fleishman, Note, The Empire Strikes Back: The
Influence of the United States Motion PictureIndustry on Russian Copyright Law, 26
CORNELL INTIL L.J. 189, 190 (1993).
62.
As one scholar has recently noted, this type of public-private
partnership is increasingly used to pursue "varying, but complementary goals."
Gregory Shaffer, The Law-In-Action of International Trade Litigation in the United
States and Europe: The Melding of the Public and the Private 4 (Mar. 26, 2000)
In the United States, these
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
relationships create a symbiotic relationship, in which the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) relies on private industry for information and
then aggressively pursues industry complaints. Id. at 10-11. States and private
industry are interested in combating piracy for different reasons; the former see
piracy as harmful to the system of international trade, while the latter sees piracy
as harmful to their own profits.
Id. at 72-76.
63.

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN RUSSIA

20001

1213

particular, Article VIII of the Trade Agreement provides that the
parties have agreed to:
(a)

ensure in accordance with the provisions of internal
legislation, protection and implementation of intellectual
property rights, including copyright on literary, scientific and
artistic works including computer programs and data bases

(b)

ensure that their international commitments in the field of
intellectual property rights are honored...
encourage appropriate arrangements between institutions
within the United States and [Russia] to provide protection
64
for intellectual property rights.

(c)

In other words, the Trade Agreement obliges Russia to enforce its
domestic copyright laws6 s and to honor its international copyright
commitments. 6 6 In addition, the Trade Agreement provides for
prompt consultations "through appropriate channels" at the
request of either party to discuss the interpretation and
67
implementation of these laws and commitments.
The Trade Agreement also provides for periodic consultations
within the framework of the Joint US-USSR Commercial
Commission, 6 8 as well as a special working group on intellectual
property matters. 6 9
As a result, there are a variety of
opportunities for U.S. officials to discuss the enforcement of
arbitrazhcopyright decisions with their Russian counterparts.
Generally speaking, industry associations in both the United
States and Europe ensure that the government makes use of
these opportunities by bringing together a variety of corporations,
exchanging information
with
the United
States Trade
Representative
(USTR),
"educating" the interagency
301
Committee, and lobbying Congress for trade sanctions. 70 For
example, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) has
urged the U.S. government to keep Russia on the Priority Watch
List in 2000. 7 1 The USTR first placed Russia on the "Priority

64.
Trade Agreement, supranote 61, art. VIII(1)(a)-(c).
65.
See supranotes 4-5.
66.
See supranotes 7-8.
67.
Trade Agreement, supranote 61, art. XIV(2).
68.
Id. art. XIV(I).
69.
Id. art. VIII(S). In a recent interview, an official from the U.S. Embassy
in Moscow who monitors Russian developments with regard to intellectual
property reported that the working group meets once per year.
70.
Shaffer, supra note 62, at 15-2 1.
71.
INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, supra note 1, at 138. The IIPA's
members are the Association of American Publishers, the Interactive Digital
Software Association, the American Film Makers Association, the Motion Picture
Association of America, the Business Software Alliance, the National Music
Publishers' Association, and the Recording Industry Association of America. Intl
Intellectual Prop. Alliance, IIPA Members, at http://www.iipa.com/html/
iipa.members.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2000). The IIPA also has asked the U.S.

1214

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:1203

Watch List" in 1997 because it believed that Russia was not
72
This
fulfilling its obligations under the Trade Agreement.
action, which was taken under Section 301 of the United States
Trade Act of 1974, meant that Russia could be subjected at any
time to unilateral trade sanctions by the United States for its
failure to adequately protect and enforce U.S. parties' intellectual
property rights. 73 As one intellectual property lobbyist has noted,
the Section 301 process has generally been "a huge success" for
74
If this corporate
copyright industries in the United States.
lobbying continues, President Putin will be under significant
intergovernmental pressure to improve enforcement of domestic
courts' copyright decisions.
B. European Companies and the EC-Russia
PartnershipAgreement
Two provisions of the Partnership Agreement are of particular
interest to European copyright industries. Article 54 states:
Pursuant to the provisions of this Article and Annex 10, the Parties
confirm the importance they attach to ensure adequate and
effective protection and enforcement of intellectual, industrial and
[I]mplementation of the provisions
commercial property rights ....
of this Article and Annex 10 shall be regularly reviewed by the
Parties in accordance with [the Article establishing the "Cooperation
Council"I. If problems in the area of intellectual, industrial and
commercial property affecting trading conditions were to occur,
either
urgent consultations shall be undertaken, at the request of 75
Party, with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory solutions.
Annex 10 provides that:
Russia shall continue to improve the protection of intellectual,
industrial and commercial property rights in order to provide, by
the end of the fifth year after the entry into force of the Agreement,

government to remove some of the special tariff preferences currently granted to
INT'L
Russia in accordance with the U.S. General System of Preferences.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, supranote 1, at 146.
Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 64. Twelve of the fifteen countries that
72.
formerly constituted the Soviet Union are currently on the "Priority Watch List."
Peter B. Necarsulmer, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, Moscow TIMES, June
27, 2000, at 8.
Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994), amended by
73.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301,
102 Stat. 1107 (1988). This is known as a "Special 301" procedure. "Special 301"
refers to a 1988 amendment to the Trade Act that requires the USTR to identify
those foreign countries that deny either (1) adequate and effective intellectual
property protection to U.S. persons, or (2) fair and equitable market access to U.S.
persons who rely upon such protection, thus triggering Section 301. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2242(a).
Shaffer, supra note 62, at 32 (citing an unnamed intellectual property
74.
lobbyist).
Partnership Agreement, supra note 61, art. 54(1)-(3).
75.
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for a level of protection similar to that existing in the Community,
including effective methods of enforcing such rights .... 76

In short, the Partnership Agreement obligates the Russian
Federation to harmonize its protection and enforcement of
copyrights with the relevant provisions of European Union law by
January 1, 2002, and provides mechanisms for reviewing
Russia's progress towards this goal. 77 In addition, Article 98
ensures European plaintiffs full access to the Russian court
system, thus providing an additional guarantee that such
plaintiffs can pursue litigation as suggested in the first
78
substantive part of this paper.
European Union copyright law currently consists of
five directives, which concern computer programs, 79 rental and
lending rights,8 0 satellite broadcasts and cable retransmissions,8 1
copyright duration,8 2 and databases.8 3
Annex 10 of the
Partnership Agreement requires Russia to enact parallel
84
protections within its own law where it has not already done so.
Russian authorities recognize this requirement and are making

76.
Id. annex 10, para. 1.
77.
The European Union assists Russia in these efforts through the TACIS
(Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) Program. The
only limit on Russia's obligations under the Partnership Agreement is found in
Article 19 thereof, which mirrors the limitation on free trade found in Article 36 of
the EEC Treaty. The Partnership Agreement provides: "The Agreement shall not
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit
justified on grounds of . . . the protection of intellectual, industrial and
commercial property ....
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however,
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between the Parties." Partnership Agreement, supranote 61, art. 19.
78.
Article 98 provides in pertinent part:
Within the scope of this Agreement, each Party undertakes to ensure that
natural and legal persons of the other Party have access free of

discrimination in relation to its own nationals to the competent courts and
administrative organs of the Parties to defend their individual rights and
their property rights, including those concerning intellectual, industrial
and commercial property.

Id. art. 98(1).
79.
Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 43.
80.
Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61.
81.
Council Directive 93/83/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15.
82.
Council Directive 93/98/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9.
83.
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 11
Mar. 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
84.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Michiel Elst suggests that
Russian law already largely converges with the first four of these directives.
Michiel Elst, The Interaction of European Community and Russian Copyright Law:
A Matter of Partnership and Cooperation, 22 REv. C. & E. EUR. L. 267, 285-329
(1996).
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significant progress toward fulfilling their obligations in this
regard. 8 s
In addition, the Partnership Agreement ensures that there
are a variety of ways in which the European Union can pursue
improved enforcement of Russia's copyright laws.
The
Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Russia
provides for a variety of regular meetings between relevant
parties, including meetings twice a year between the President of
the Council of the European Union and the President of the
Commission of the European Communities on one side and the
President of Russia on the other,8 6 biannual meetings between
senior officials of the European Union and their Russian
counterparts, 8 7 and meetings of experts. 88 The Agreement also
establishes a "Cooperation Council," which must meet annually
to review implementation of the Agreement.8 9
Finally,
Commission and Council representatives can refer any dispute
with Russia to the Cooperation Council, which is obliged to settle
such disputes by means of either a binding recommendation or
referral to a non-binding three-member panel.9 0
European copyright industries have two lobbying options;
they can either pursue a formal, intergovernmental procedure,
known as the Article 133 process, or file private petitions with the
European Union under the relatively new Trade Barrier
Regulation. 9 1
The Article 133 process enables European
copyright industries to lobby a central committee in Brussels for
unilateral trade sanctions. 9 2 The Trade Barrier Regulation, on
the other hand, permits such businesses to petition the European
Commission directly for formal sanctions or other retaliatory
actions. 93 Copyright industries may choose to use one or both of
these mechanisms in consultation with the European
Commission.9 4
In short, like their U.S. counterparts, European copyright
industries can and should lobby the relevant public institutions
to pressure Russia for significant improvements in enforcing
domestic courts' copyright law decisions.
85.
See generally Remarks by RF Justice Ministry Officials on Intellectual
Property Rights at a Breakfast of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia
(Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Feb. 22, 2000), supranote 60.
86.
Partnership Agreement, supra note 61, art. 7.
87.
Id. art. 8.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. arts. 90-94.

90.
91.
the Trade
92.
93.
94.

Id. art. 101.
Two copyright-related complaints already have been filed pursuant to
Barrier Regulation. Shaffer, supra note 62, 53 n. 177.
Id. at 42-48.
Id. at 49.
Id.
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IV.

COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: THE CASE FOR ADMITTING RUSSIA

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 9 s was originally
adopted in 1947 as a temporary measure, 9 6 and was part of a
broader effort to create a system of financial and economic
institutions which would ensure global economic development
after World War 11. 9 7 GATT was gradually transformed from a
short-term agreement concerning reciprocal liberalization of
tariffs into a complex system of more than 200 multilateral trade
agreements 98 as well as an international trade forum for its 114
signatories. 9 9 While there is little disagreement about the relative
00
success of GATT during the five decades that followed the War,'
there is also no doubt that it had become increasingly
counterproductive by the mid-1980s. Efforts to improve GATT
culminated in the Uruguay Round (1987-1993), which resulted in
adoption of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement).' 0 ' The WTO Agreement includes
several annexes, including the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)' 0 2 and the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU).l 0 3 Member states are required to
adhere to all annexes to the WTO Agreement. 104

95.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
96.
Id. art. XXIX(2)-(3).
97.
Other institutions created at the time for this purpose included the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATTWTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT'L L. J. 421, 422 (1998). GATT was designed to
promote open trade by requiring states to make four commitments: (1) to treat all
trade partners equally as "most-favored nation[s]"; (2) to observe the principle of
"national treatment" by treating all imports in the same manner as equivalent
domestic products with regard to national tax and other laws; (3) "to reduce tariffs
on imports"; and (4) to eliminate "quotas on imports." Id. at 425.
98.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World
Trade Organizationand the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since
1948, 31 COMMON MARKET L.R. 1157, 1159-60 (1994).
99.
Kennedy, supranote 97, at 423-24.
See Petersmann, supranote 98, at 1159.
100.
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
101.
108 Stat. 4809, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
102. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
103.
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU].
104. WTO Agreement, supra note 101, art. 11(2).
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TRIPS is widely viewed as one of the most important results
of the Uruguay Round.1 0 5 Unlike GATT, which generally required
states to refrain from certain acts, TRIPS obligates all WTO
members to take positive actions when necessary to ensure
certain minimum levels of intellectual property protection1 0 6 and
enforcement.107 This is the first time that rules on domestic
enforcement have been incorporated into an international
intellectual property treaty. 10 8 TRIPS also requires that WTO
members change their laws as needed to ensure compliance with
key provisions of several prior international treaties, two of which
concern copyrights.' 0 9
As mentioned above, TRIPS provides for dispute settlement
within the World Trade Organization." I0 This is the sole means of
resolving disputes regarding the proper interpretation or
implementation of TRIPS once international consultations have
failed."' The DSU is generally viewed as a vast improvement
over the 1947 GATT dispute settlement mechanism, largely
because it replaces diplomacy with the adjudication of legal
rights. 1 2 In particular, the DSU establishes a single, rules-based
system for resolving disputes, which includes a right to appellate
review.1 1 3 Briefly, complainants alleging violations of TRIPS, and
a failure to resolve such violations through bilateral
consultations, may request that a panel be established to review

105. Daniel Gervais describes the agreement as "undoubtedly the most
significant milestone in the development of intellectual property in this century."
DANIEL GERVAIs, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS § 1.01
(1998).
106. TRIPS, supra note 102, arts. 9-40. For the mandatory standards of
copyright protection, see id. arts. 9-14.
107. Id. arts. 41-61. As a result of TRIPS, all WTO members are required to
provide effective enforcement, fair and equitable procedures, and certain specific
civil and administrative remedies in intellectual property disputes. Id. arts. 41-49.
For mandatory civil and criminal remedies, as well as border measures, see id.
arts. 50-61.
108. Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging
World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 403 (1996).
109. TRIPS, supra note 102, arts. 3, 9(1), 10, 14. In particular, TRIPS
requires all WTO members to protect intellectual property rights in accordance
with the Berne Convention, supranote 7, and the International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43.
110. TRIPS, supra note 102, art. 64(1).
111. DSU, supra note 103, art. 23.
112. Judith H. Bello, Some PracticalObservations About WTO Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 357-358 (1997). See also
Kovatch, supra note 3, at 1005-06; Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, The W70
Panel Process: An Evaluation of the First Three Years, 32 INT'L LAw. 709, 710
(1998).
113. DSU, supranote 103, arts. 17-19.
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their claims. 1 14 The complaint must be framed appropriately. 1 15
Assuming that the complaint is appropriate, the panel must
address the claim within nine months." 6 Panel reports are then
binding upon the parties." 7 Failure to alter national laws in the
manner suggested by the panel may lead to a judgment requiring
compensation by the offending state or the suspension of trade
concessions between the complainant and such state." 8 Appeals
proceedings must be completed within sixty days of appeal, and
are limited to issues of law raised in the panel report." 9
The DSU has been utilized already to resolve several TRIPS
disputes. 120
Early analyses which stressed the difficulties of
resolving TRIPS disputes within the new system of dispute
resolution have proven incorrect. 12 1 While discussion of past
panel decisions is beyond the scope of this brief overview of
TRIPS, it appears that the DSU creates an adversarial litigation
process that emphasizes fair procedures, coherence and integrity
in its decisions, and institutional sensitivity. In short, it is a
process that the participating states view as legitimate. 122 As one
observer notes, "[t]aken together, the enforcement and disputesettlement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement put teeth into the
pre-existing intellectual property conventions ... ." 123

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 20.
Id. art. 21(1).
Id. art. 22.
Id. art. 17(5)-(6).

120.

GATT SECRETARIAT, OVERVIEW OF THE STATE-OF-PLAY OF WTO DISPUTES

(Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/dispue/
stplaye.doc (last visited Oct. 26, 2000).
121.
E.g., Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441, 445-446
(1997); J.H. Reichman & David Lange, BargainingAround the TRIPS Agreement:
The Case for Ongoing Public-PrivateInitiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual
Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11 (1998) (arguing that TRIPS
will cause private companies to negotiate directly with public institutions in
foreign countries that do not adequately protect intellectual property, rather than
lobby their own governments to pursue complaints within the WTO).
122.
Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in
International Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence,in THE EU, THE
WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 35 (J.H.H.
Weiler ed., Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law vol. 9, 1998). In
the past five years, more than 180 formal claims have been filed. Where those
claims were not settled, the European Union complied with panel judgments by
modifying domestic regulations and practices in all but two cases. In those two
cases, the EU Bananas Case and the EU Meat Hormones Case, the states
accepted the resulting sanctions. See also Shaffer, supra note 62, at 2 n.4;
Andrew W. Shoyer & Heather G. Forton, Comments, Performance of the System ff:
PanelAdjudication, 32 INT'L LAW. 737, 739 (1998).
123. J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS
Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335, 339 (1997).
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Under the terms of the WTO Agreement, any state that was
not a member of GATT may accede to the WTO. 12 4 Russia first
sought admission to the WTO in 1993, but has only been granted
observer status to date. 125 Russia would like to be admitted to
the WTO, since "[miembership would create jobs, attract foreign
investment, secure access to western markets on excellent trade
terms and help to revive the output of domestic goods." 126 Both
the United States and the European Union have expressed their
commitment to having Russia join the WTO.1 2 7 In order for
Russia to join the WTO, it will have to pass through four
overlapping stages: (1) preliminary disclosure of information to
WTO officials by memorandum; (2) bilateral accession
negotiations; (3) finalizing negotiations and analysis of Russia's
trade regime; and (4) presentation of a draft "Protocol of
Accession" and other negotiation documents to either the General
Council or the Ministerial Conference of the WTO.' 2 8 Upon
approval by the Ministerial Conference "by a two-thirds majority
vote of WTO members, the applicant may sign the protocol and
accede to the WTO. "129 Russia and the WTO are currently in the
midst of bilateral negotiations and analyzing Russia's trade
30
regime.1
Russia will not be permitted to join the WTO if it fails to
protect copyrights and other intellectual property rights in
accordance with TRIPS. Some Western parties have argued that
Russia is not eligible to join the WTO because its laws do not
meet the minimum standards required by TRIPS. In particular,
these parties insist that Russia must extend retroactive protection
to all "pre-1995 U.S sound recordings and pre-1973 U.S.

124.
WTO Agreement, supranote 101, art. XII(1).
125.
Christian L. Broadbent & Amanda M. McMiuian, Russia and the World
Trade Organization: Will TRIPS be a Stumbling Block to Accession?, 8 DUKE J.
COMP. & INTL L. 519, 533 (1998).

126.

Bradford W.C. Pirie, Russia's Economic Future:

A Step Towards

Economic Recovery or Merely a Detour Towards Economic AbsorptionP, 4 J. INT'L L.

& PRAc. 571, 579 (1995).
127.
President Clinton and then-President Yeltsin originally targeted 1998
as the year in which Russia would be admitted to the WTO. Stephanie BakerSaid, Russia's Bid for WTO in '98 Looks Slim, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997,
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File. See also Common Strategy of the European
Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia, 1999 O.J. (L 157) 1, available at http://europa.
eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1999/en_499X0414.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2000).
128.
Broadbent & McMillian, supra note 125, at 521-523. The Ministerial
Conference includes a representative from each WTO member state, and meets at
least once every two years. WTO Agreement, supra note 101, art. IV(1). A twothirds majority of the Conference is required to approve such an accession. Id.

art. XII(2).
129.
130.

Broadbent & McMillian, supra note 125, at 523.
Daniel M. Price et al., The Importance of Russia's Accession to the World

Trade Organization, RUSSIA BUS. WATCH, Spring 2000, at 5.

2000]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN RUSSIA

1221

works,"1 3 1 and that Russia needs to provide power for civil ex
parte searches.1 3 2 While these objections appear to be legitimate,
they are also clearly resolvable. x33 Stronger arguments against
admitting Russia to the WTO emphasize problems with Russia's
enforcement of existing written laws.13 4 One careful review of
this matter has concluded, however, that "[u]nder a loose
interpretive standard, Russia could possibly slip past significant
problems with enforcing TRIPS."' 3 5
Much has been made of the fact that Russia's copyright
regime may not be compatible with TRIPS.' 3 6
It appears,
however, that a tactical choice remains: should Russia's legal
shortcomings prevent it from entering the WTO, or would it be
better to overlook those failings, admit Russia to the WTO, and
then seek enforcement of TRIPS standards? 3 7
If Russia is
admitted to the WTO, then public-private cooperation can bring
TRIPS-based disputes before WTO panels.' 3 8 In the case of U.S.
copyright industries, that litigation could be initiated by
petitioning the USTR. I3 9 In Europe, copyright industries can
lobby a variety of public institutions to pursue TRIPS disputes
within the WTO. 14 ° It is clear that the combined support of the
United States and the European Union would suffice to bring
Russia into the WTO, where it could then be forced to ratchet up
enforcement of its own intellectual property laws in accordance
with TRIPS. Copyright industries would therefore be well advised
to support, rather than block, Russian accession to the WTO.

131.
INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, supra note 1, at 147. See also
Boffey, supra note 61, at 110.
132.
INTL INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, supranote 1, at 149.
133.
In fact, all of the relevant amendments to Russian law have been
drafted and are, or soon will be, making their way through the Russian legislative
process. Remarks by RF Justice Ministry Officials on Intellectual Property Rights at
a Breakfast of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (Official Kremlin
International News Broadcast, Feb. 22, 2000), supra note 60.
134.
Kovatch, supra note 3, at 1036. See also Broadbent & McMillian,
supra note 125, at 543.
135. Broadbent & McMillian, supra note 125, at 544.
136.
See supratext accompanying notes 131-33.
137.
See supratext accompanying notes 110-23.
138.
See supranote 62.
139.
See supratext accompanying notes 70-74.
140.
See supratext accompanying notes 91-94.
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V. CONCLUSION

In order to improve copyright protection in Russia, Western
copyright owners need to pursue a comprehensive, three-pronged
approach to fighting piracy in Russia.
First, they need to
abandon their misconceptions of the Russian justice system and
pursue litigation against pirates in Russian arbitrazh courts.
Contrary to popular belief, these courts are quite capable of
handling copyright issues and have shown little if any bias
against foreign plaintiffs. These courts, however, are often unable
to ensure satisfactory enforcement of their own judgments. In
response, Western copyright industries should lobby the Office of
the United States Trade Representative and the relevant public
institutions in Europe for unilateral trade sanctions. At the very
least, this intergovernmental pressure will serve as a consistent
reminder to the Putin government that weak enforcement of
copyright judgments is a sore point in relations between Russia
and the Western world; at best, fear of unilateral trade sanctions
may lead to significant improvements in the enforcement of
arbitrazh court judgments.
Finally, Western copyright industries should abandon any
efforts to keep Russia out of the WTO. Instead, they should lobby
their governments to make Russia a full member of the WTO as
soon as possible. This will enable these industries to lobby their
public officials to bring effective complaints within the WTO's
dispute settlement process against Russia for any subsequent
failure to enforce copyright judgments in accordance with TRIPS.
In sum, Western copyright industries must abandon their
misconceptions regarding the Russian justice system, redouble
their lobbying efforts for bilateral trade sanctions, and reverse
their opposition to making Russia a full member of the WTO if
they want to reduce copyright piracy in Russia.

